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1. The topic and background
Reasoning, as an exercise of the capacity of reason, is traditionally viewed as 
having two domains of application: theoretical and practical. The first domain, 
theoretical reasoning, raises intellectual questions about beliefs. These are ques-
tions about what one should believe, questions about evidence and proof. Prac-
tical reasoning is different in that it takes “praxis” itself as its subject. At stake is 
what the thing to do is in particular situations and contexts. Questions concern-
ing the relationship of reasoning to motivation and intention then come to the 
fore, as does the specific relationship of reasoning to the nature of action. 
In this special issue our first interest is in exploring the mark Elizabeth 
Anscombe left on the way we approach questions of reason, reasoning and 
action. Anscombe may in fact be considered largely responsible for the current 
the shape of the philosophical theory of action, as R. Audi describes below:
The concepts of reasons as supporting elements, of practical reason as a capac-
ity, and of practical reasoning as a process are central in the theory of action. 
(Audi, 2004: 118)1
Yet such central issues in the theory of action are directly connected in 
Anscombe’s philosophy to wider issues such as the nature of practical knowl-
edge and truth, the way moral philosophy works around a concept of virtue, 
or the relationships between the linguistic use of the first person and the status 
of self-knowledge. Also, if one wants to understand her philosophy as a whole, 
its relations to Wittgenstein’s thought are inescapable, as is her own interpre-
tation of the work of a man she held as friend.
1. Of course, one could claim that Donald Davidson has such role but, precisely, we do not 
want to see things as such. We see the importance of the renewed interested in Anscombe’s 
work as countering such picture.
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Elizabeth Anscombe, the person, was a puzzling character. She was a bril-
liant philosopher and she was an eccentric. She did not shy away from calling 
people ‘stupid’ (also in writing) when she did not agree with them. She was 
also, undoubtedly, an original thinker who was slow to gain recognition over 
the years given the difficulty of so much of her work2, which not only needs 
to be read patiently and attentively but also several times in order to achieve 
a non-simplistic understanding of her thought. Presenting the complexity of 
what appears to be simple was always one of Anscombe’s goals, as well as 
unmasking the banality of certain theories that, hidden behind labels and 
gestures, are presented as sophisticated (Wiseman, 2016: 2). This comes 
together in the fact that unlike most academic philosophers today, Anscombe 
did not view philosophy as a technical discipline but rather as the task of 
thinking about ultimate issues and addressing the most difficult questions (see 
Wiseman, 2016: 17).
All things considered, the way Anscombe is received today is a complex 
matter. Her writings on the philosophy of mind and action are admired by 
many. As for some of her writings on morals, many modern-day readers polite-
ly look away. Yet her positions in those fields are not unconnected. In what-
ever case, not everything about Anscombe is applauded: there is also a lot of 
criticism and even reproach, and not only in relation to the contents of some 
of her writings on moral issues. For example, Simon Blackburn, who unhesi-
tatingly describes Anscombe as one of the most influential moral philosophers 
of recent times, has no qualms about saying that this influence is largely unfor-
tunate because of her particularly fierce and aggressive approach to morality 
and philosophy. Yet even though Blackburn rejects some of the applications 
of Anscombe’s ethics and in general dislikes her tone, he also recognizes that 
all moral theorists share with Anscombe the need to articulate the central ideas 
of the dignity and value of human life, and of the virtues necessary to live it 
well. What Blackburn cannot approve of with regard to Anscombe is the fact 
that she devoted much so more space in her work to justice than to “altruism, 
benevolence, charity, compassion, empathy, forgiveness, mercy, sympathy, or 
love” (Blackburn, 2005). All in all, he feels that such a difficult area as ethics 
requires a more delicate touch than Anscombe’s. 
We are well aware of the mixed reactions aroused by Anscombe’s work; we 
find them thought-provoking and bore them in mind while preparing this 
special issue of Enrahonar. It was conceived to mark the centenary of Ans-
combe’s birth as well as the 50th anniversary of An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s 
2. In order to have a realistic historical picture of Anscombe’s career and position in 20th 
century academic philosophy it is worth keeping in mind that by the time she began her 
studies at Oxford (1938), the University had admitted women for not so long (since the 
late 1870s) and degrees had started being awarded much more recently (in 1920). A cohort 
of well known (women) moral philosophers (Philippa Foot, Iris Murdoch, Mary Midgely 
and Mary Warnock) were Anscombe’s contemporaries at Oxford. These were all philoso-
phers interested in understanding this intricate world – the ‘deeply puzzling world’ (Midge-
ly, 2013) – rather than in dialectical academic disputes centred on discourse itself.
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‘Tractatus’3 and our main goal was to promote the study of Anscombe’s work 
as starting point for highly diverse investigations in philosophy, and not just 
philosophy of mind and action or Wittgenstein’s interpretation thereof, but 
also general investigations into the nature of practical rationality as Anscombe, 
in her controversial way, saw it. 
Despite the possible controversy, both editors of this special issue find 
immense value in Anscombe’s work, although we discovered it through very 
different paths. For one of us (SM), Anscombe’s work has often been, in 
recent years when teaching philosophy of mind or philosophy of action, 
useful for spelling out what a Wittgensteinian position might be on such 
topics as consciousness or agency. Where Wittgenstein makes gnomic com-
ments or asks seemingly mysterious questions (e.g. “An inner process stands 
in need of outward criteria” (Philosophical Investigations, §580) or “What is 
left over if I subtract the fact that my arm raises from the fact that I raise my 
arm?” (Philosophical Investigations, §621)), Anscombe provides us with fine, 
explicit analyses. The study of Anscombe has also been a way to go back to 
the topics of former publications on the philosophy of action whose funda-
mental orientation was not completely satisfactory (see Mauro, Miguens and 
Cadilha, 20134). 
The other one of us (DGA) is particularly interested in epistemology and 
the nature of inference and justification. This led her to the study of theoret-
ical and practical reasoning and to analyse diverse problems that each of them 
must overcome. Hence the interest in the idea of reasoning as a mental action: 
for Anscombe (Anscombe, 1981), inference is an action, like the action we 
perform when moving a chess piece.
Anscombe believed in the need to broaden the class of actions that depend 
on practice to include following a rule and speaking a language. She discusses 
this in “The Question of Linguistic Idealism” (1981). If a special type of action 
is one in which the subject knows what he/she is doing, and this is what 
defines it as an action and not as a mere event or occurrence, then we would 
have to conclude that it is in the nature of action that the subject knows that 
he/she is the agent of that action, and so we fall back into circularity. The 
problem is how to get out of the explanatory circle.
If we consider the notion of action, and which actions are relevant, as our 
object of study, we see that it can be claimed that intentional actions are the 
3. The book was published in 1959 (2nd edition 1963) and it inaugurated a radical change in 
how the Tractatus was read.
4. This is a book of interviews with philosophers and theoreticians of action (Alfred Mele, 
Michael Bratman, Hugh McCann, Joshua Knobe, Daniel Hausman, George Ainslie). We 
used the same initial script for all interviews. The questions were the following: 1) In your 
view, what are the most central (or important) problems in the philosophy of action? 
2) For some or all of the following problems – action, agency and agent – what do they 
contrast with most significantly? 3) Which of these are liable to be rational/irrational? 4) In 
what sense is the thing to do to be decided by what is rational? Are there limits to ration-
ality? 5) What explains action, and how? What is the role of deliberation in rationality? 
6) How is akrasia possible (if you think it is)?
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relevant form of action. However, if intentional action is only one type of 
action, why is this form of action privileged? Such a question is usually 
addressed by saying that intentional action is important because it is 
explained with reference to rationality, since there is a close link between 
rationality and intention, to the extent that if an action is performed for a 
reason, then it is intentional. The problem then is that when we want to 
justify that the action is a special category of event for which we can give a 
reason, we fall into circularity. Anscombe describes this circularity in Intention: 
“Why is giving a start or gasp not an ‘action’, while sending for a taxi, or 
crossing the road, is one? The answer cannot be “Because the answer to the 
question ‘why?’ may give a reason in the latter cases”, for the answer may ‘give 
a reason’ in the former cases too; and we cannot say “Ah, but not a reason for 
acting”; we should be going round in circles” (Anscombe, 2000: §5).
For Anscombe, the problem when defining an action as an event that is 
performed for a reason is that the reason why we perform the action is explained 
either as a reason-for-action or as a reason-for-something that occurs. How-
ever, the latter is not useful. On the other hand, in the first case we count on 
the fact that ‘action’ is something we already understand whereas it is supposed 
to be that which requires explanation (see Ford, 2011: 99).
2. The contributions
This special issue of Enrahonar gathers a wide variety of interesting materials on 
Anscombe’s work. The authors that responded to our challenge are also of quite 
diverse geographic provenance, coming the UK, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal 
and Turkey. We organized them around some of Anscombe’s biggest interests 
– modern moral philosophy, intention, interpretation of Wittgenstein and the 
first person. The articles concern, respectively, rationality, action, language and 
understanding (Roger Teichmann), modern moral philosophy before and after 
Anscombe (Constantine Sandis), Anscombe and Aristotelianism in moral phi-
losophy (Susana Cadilha), the epistemology of moral prohibitions (Michael 
Wee), natural expression of intention according to Wittgenstein and Anscombe 
(Duncan Richter), the unity of ‘intention’ (Noam Melamed), voluntary action 
in Intention (Jean-Philippe Narboux), the relationships between Anscombe and 
Wittgenstein’s philosophies (Elisa Grimi) and finally the first person, by this 
meaning the relationship between first person reports and issues regarding 
consciousness and self-consciousness (Eylem Özaltun). We briefly describe 
the contents of the articles below. But first a few words about two of Anscombe’s 
major works, Intention and “Modern Moral Philosophy”.
One of Anscombe’s biggest interests was ‘intention’. It is perhaps the 
topic her name is more intimately connected with, so it is well worth 
remembering the context in which Intention appeared. As Anscombe herself 
states in her introduction, Intention contains mostly the lectures she gave at 
Oxford University in 1957. A year earlier, the university had proposed the 
award of an honorary degree to the president of the United States, Harry S. 
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Truman5. Truman was appointed president after the death of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt in 1945 and it was he who gave the order to drop the atomic bombs 
on Japan that killed more than 80,000 civilians on impact and a similar num-
ber over the next few months. In 1956, Anscombe published the pamphlet 
“Mr. Truman’s Degree” (1957b) in which she gave her reasons for opposing 
the proposition. She claimed Truman had done something that was clearly 
immoral in terms of traditional casuistry, i.e. had directly and deliberately used 
civilians as targets for a military attack. In the conclusion to her pamphlet, 
Anscombe wondered whether the ethics taught at Oxford were the cause or a 
symptom of the lack of moral sensitivity demonstrated by members of its 
academic body on this occasion. In a way, she was calling for open rational 
argumentation in ethics, beyond meta-ethics, and made it clear such argumen-
tation applied very directly to practical real-world issues. 
Intention came to light as a development of certain pages of “Mr. Truman’s 
Degree”, as did an article published two years later, “Modern Moral Philoso-
phy”, which expanded on the last two pages of the pamphlet. One of the 
debates raised by the case analysed in “Mr. Truman’s Degree” was the distinc-
tion between murder and causing death, a distinction which is very often 
discussed from an ethical and legal standpoint. In “Modern Moral Philosophy” 
Anscombe claimed that moral philosophy cannot be productive without an 
adequate and prior philosophy of psychology. Three of the terms that required 
conceptual clarification before any ethical analysis were the three concepts that 
Anscombe introduces in Intention: “(…) ‘expression of intention for the 
future, intentional action, and intention in acting’ (contents, §1, p. i)” (Wise-
man, 2016: 27). Some of the most relevant questions raised in Intention occur 
precisely in the light of this clarification and this special issue shows why they 
are still as relevant as ever.
One of the ideas that Anscombe analyzes in “Modern Moral Philosophy” 
is the virtue of justice and what it is to be a “fair person”. As Teichmann (2018) 
underlines, this investigation covers a number of issues. In this context it is 
especially worth exploring and analyzing the relevance of ideas such as moral 
bedrock, moral ‘hinge propositions’ and connatural knowledge, among others. 
The first articles in this special issue are dedicated to this. 
In his article, Roger Teichmann assumes that the criterion for knowing 
whether someone understands the words of a language includes acting accord-
5. When Oxford University proposed to give an honorary degree to then ex- president Harry 
Truman, who had ordered the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Anscombe opposed 
it in a speech delivered to her colleagues in which she argued that one may as well honor 
Genghis Khan, Nero, or Hitler. In Truman’s defense, she heard it said that all he actually 
did was to sign his name on a piece of paper, that it wasn’t his aim to kill innocent civilians, 
and that his only intention was to end the war.
This led her to think that it was worth a philosopher’s time to explain what it is to 
intend to do something, and so she decided to give a series of lectures on that topic, which 
grew into her Intention. (See “Mr. Truman’s Degree”, in Ethics, Religion, and Politics, and 
Mary Geach’s “Introduction”, in Human Life, Action and Ethics) (Stoutland, 2011: 4).
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ingly. If we accept that understanding is manifested in the use of language, 
then by teaching a person the meanings of words, we are trying to instil in 
him or her an ability, and an inclination, to use those words correctly. 
He focuses on the use of modals as seen by Anscombe, for example, “you 
have to ϕ” (e.g. you have to collaborate). Actions include what is specified in 
the modal’s statements (ϕ -ing, solidarity). In the specific case of stopping and 
forcing modals, we also aim to instil the inclination to do (or not do) what is 
mentioned as what we “have to” or “cannot” do. 
According to Teichmann, we assume by default certain linguistic compe-
tence in people who do not learn and this explains why there are people who 
say they understand “to have to collaborate” (you have to ϕ) while they are not 
willing to respond in an adequate way, that is, collaborating-solidarity (ϕ -ing)
From here Teichmann argues that it becomes normal for members of some 
social group not to respond adequately to detention and/or forced modals of 
one kind or another. This situation gives rise to a certain conceptual and 
practical confusion that Anscombe already highlighted when she wrote about 
moral duty and ‘moral obligation’.
Hence, Teichmann concludes that if we assume that the understanding of 
modal statements is manifested in forms of voluntary action, the internalist 
approach according to which one only has reason to obey a rule if doing so 
favours the satisfaction of one’s desires is inconsistent. For Teichmann, an inter-
nalist on reasons for action adheres to the erroneous notion of logical independ-
ence, that is, he/she considers thought, will and understanding to be logically 
independent of action because they are based on the idea that an action is 
performed in view of a reason for it and reason is found when one first seeks 
to satisfy one’s desires. Desires, for the internist, are independent of actions. In 
contrast, Teichmann holds that understanding, meaning, and action are close-
ly intertwined and the desire that seeks the reason for action is subsequent to 
that action. 
Constantine Sandis’ article is a in-depth survey of the state of moral philos-
ophy and philosophy of action before and after Anscombe’s 1958 “Modern 
Moral Philosophy”. A gallery of moral philosophers – “after 1958” and “before 
1957” – are put into perspective in the light of Anscombe’s controversial claims 
in “Modern Moral Philosophy”. Many of this philosophers disagreed with Ans-
combe. Sandis’ conclusions are not very optimistic – in fact he speaks of tragic 
irony. A great deal happened in moral philosophy and theory of action from 
1958 that was neither predicted not intended by Anscombe and which actually 
went against her way of seeing how things should be. Her views gave rise to 
virtue ethics as simply one more option in normative ethics and to a strand of 
moral psychology with an eye on cognitive science. The general diagnosis of our 
times is that we have moral philosophy replete with consequentialist thinking 
obsessed with trolley-cases, a “philosophy of psychology” that has replaced con-
ceptual explorations with cognitive science, an empirical moral psychology that 
is sceptical about character traits, the re-branding of psychology as cognitive 
science, and virtue ethics as a theory of ‘morally right action’. None of this was 
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intended by Anscombe. In fact, Sandis claims that, by comparison, things were 
better before her. Moral philosophy was in a much better shape between the 
beginning of the 20th century and the publication of “Modern Moral Philoso-
phy” (two good examples being Ross and Prichard). The increased specialisation 
of academic philosophy led to an offshoot that went against both the spirit and 
the letter of “Modern Moral Philosophy”. Anyway, regardless of how one judg-
es the accounts of action that Anscombe criticized, and the account she favoured 
in their place, Sandis last word is that “Modern Moral Philosophy” seems to 
have inadvertently created a wedge between ethics and action theory. 
In her article, Susana Cadilha looks at Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Theory” 
as a founding text in the revival of virtue ethics. Anscombe believed it is possi-
ble to do ethics without using concepts such as ‘moral ought’ or ‘moral obliga-
tion’ and the perfect example of this is Aristotelian ethics. On the other hand, 
Anscombe claims that moral philosophy is not useful at present, since she finds 
that philosophically there is a huge gap that needs to be filled by an account of 
human nature, human action and human ‘flourishing’. The gap Anscombe 
refers to appears where there should be “proof that an unjust man is a bad 
man”. Cadilha’s aim in her paper is to discuss the various ways in which Ans-
combe’s theses can be interpreted. For that she brings in two other philosophers 
for whom Aristotelian virtue ethics was also essential – Philippa Foot and John 
McDowell. Cadilha finally argues that Anscombe did not expect Aristotelian 
ethics to answer the problems that modern ethics poses.
Michael Wee’s article deals with an issue in ethics: absolute prohibition. 
Anscombe is well-known for her insistence that there are absolutely prohibit-
ed actions, yet she is somewhat obscure about why this is so. Wee claims that 
Anscombe’s view of connatural moral knowledge (which resembles moral 
intuition) is key to understanding her thoughts on moral prohibitions. He 
identifies key features of Anscombe’s moral epistemology before going on to 
investigate its sources. He examines the roots of connaturality in Aquinas and 
compares it with rationalist ethical intuitionism (which Anscombe differs from 
by rejecting ‘good’ as a simple, non-natural property). Wee then produces a 
two-stage argument about absolute prohibition: the first stage is loosely Thom-
istic, while the second suggests how Anscombe’s absolute prohibitions can be 
seen as a continuation of Wittgenstein’s anti-scepticism in On Certainty. He 
presents an account of absolute prohibitions as a form of Wittgensteinian 
hinge propositions – they are not the conclusions of deductive arguments, but 
rather the foundations for intelligibility in action.
Noam Melamed’s article starts from the conviction that ‘intention’ does 
not change in meaning across various contexts but must represent a single and 
distinctive concept that frames the argument of Anscombe’s Intention. The 
problem is that there is barely any recognizable account of this concept or the 
schema of its overall unity in her book. One reason for this is that Intention 
starts from a threefold manifestation of the concept in our natural language 
and proceeds to develop their accounts piecemeal. Another is that the notion 
of practical knowledge it introduces is too obscure to shed the light that is 
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precisely required to make the topic perspicuous as a whole. His article tries 
to address such obscurity, first by recapturing the features of Anscombe’s phil-
osophical logic and then by using them to account for the threefold division 
and its co-constitution in a wider context of rational conduct. Having done 
this, the investigation turns away from the epistemology of action and towards 
Anscombe’s view of its logic, where it becomes clearer that this broader context 
displays a distinct form of thinking.
In his article, Duncan Richter takes up the fact that Anscombe criticizes 
Wittgenstein for discussing the “natural expression of an intention” in Philo-
sophical Investigations. He considers recent responses to this dispute, especially 
those by Richard Moran and Martin Stone (writing together) and by Martin 
Gustafsson. Moran and Stone explain why Anscombe rejects talk of non-human 
animals expressing intention but emphasize the importance of language so much 
that it becomes hard to see on what basis intentions can ever be non-arbitrarily 
attributed to animals. Gustafsson notices this problem, and offers a solution 
based on biology and, in particular, knowledge of what is and is not conducive 
to the flourishing of members of each species. However, this goes beyond what 
Anscombe says and introduces new problems. Richter proposes that we can 
sometimes simply see what an individual intends to do by observing its behav-
iour, without reference to what is good or bad for members of its species. He 
claims that this is true to what Anscombe says and appears to get around the 
problems with the other views considered. 
In his article, Jean-Philippe Narboux deals with an issue that is surprisingly 
often left unaddressed in discussions around Anscombe: voluntary action. He 
acknowledges that Intention might seem to dismiss the concept of the voluntary 
as being of philosophical significance. However, he believes that the impression 
is misconceived. It stems from a misunderstanding of Anscombe’s philosophy 
of action in general and of the contribution of Intention in particular. The 
main contention of his article is that to understand the scope and nature of 
Intention’s contribution to an understanding of the voluntary, we must come 
to terms not only with the positive account that the book presents on the basis 
of its methods, but also the nature of the problems that, on the basis of these 
same methods, it deliberately shuns, on the ground that they involve consider-
ations pertaining to ethics. The article is divided into seven sections, starting 
by placing section §49 within Intention as a whole. It seeks to explain why a 
systematic account of the voluntary is deferred until such a late stage of the 
inquiry. The author then proceeds to offer a commentary on section §49, with 
the aim of unfolding and defending the various insights into the topic of the 
voluntary which he systematically brings together against the background of 
the pivotal distinction between the intentional and the voluntary. Sections 3 
to 6 constitute the main bulk of the essay and are respectively devoted to the 
four headings under which Anscombe successively apprehends the distinction 
between the intentional and the voluntary in §49. Finally, in the last section, 
Narboux tries to bring out the underlying unity of the account of the voluntary 
given in §49 as well as the deliberateness of the limitations of this account. 
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Elisa Grimi enriches this volume with her article focusing on Anscombe 
and Wittgenstein. Her hommage to Anscombe extends to her teacher, for the 
philosophical closeness between Wittgenstein and Anscombe is indisputable 
and left a deep mark on her work. Yet Anscombe was able to develop her own 
philosophy and to distance herself from her master. In her study, Grimi shows 
both common points and discrepancies between the two philosophers. Most-
ly by going back to Anscombe’s An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s “Tractatus”, 
first published in 1959, Grimi points out how Wittgenstein’s writings con-
nected with the Tractatus are decisive for understanding the maturation of Ans-
combe’s thought. In particular, she focuses on two topics: the critique of men-
talism and the distinction between causes and reasons found in Intention. 
Grimi shows the complex way in which Wittgenstein’s work and the develop-
ment of Anscombe’s thought are related, and dwells on some of the main 
points of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. This is needed to understand Anscombe’s 
thought, as well as the book she wrote on Wittgenstein which changed the 
way the Tractatus is interpreted.
In her article, Eylem Özaltun starts from Anscombe’s The First Person to 
arrive at conclusions concerning subjectivity and consciousness. The study of 
first-person reports of intentional actions, happenings, thoughts, and sensations 
as revealing of the structure of self-consciousness was a central theme of Ans-
combe’s work on philosophy of mind; Özaltun believes this has not been suf-
ficiently registered in the literature. She aims to show that this theme animated 
many of Anscombe’s works throughout her career and that “The First Person” 
(1974) is best understood as one among these and in the light of others. 
In this essay, Anscombe discusses some of the peculiar features of the 
first-person pronoun. She defends, according to many commentators (e.g. 
McDowell, Campbell, Stainton), a notoriously false view that “I” does not refer. 
Even for Anscombe’s most sympathetic readers, the conclusion is this is at best 
a confusion or a special, narrow, use of the notion of reference. The commen-
tators mostly draw this conclusion by focusing on two arguments they take 
Anscombe to give, and show that they are not good arguments. Özaltun calls 
them “Argument from Immunity to Error Through Misidentification” and 
“Anti-Cartesian Argument”. She claims that if we see “The First Person” as 
part of a project of understanding self-consciousness and its structural dis-
tinctness from consciousness, and the role of “I” in expressing self-conscious-
ness and its peculiarities as revealing the structure of the thoughts it is used 
to express, this change of focus will provide a much better reading of Ans-
combe’s article, whereby the passages in which the commentators found those 
arguments take on a different meaning and turn out not to be intended as 
direct arguments for her claim that “I” does not refer. Once we understand 
what is at stake in Anscombe’s insistence that “I” does not refer in the light of her 
other works, the conclusion starts to look much more palatable. 
These are the articles in this special issue. We hope the collection will be 
of some value to anyone involved in philosophical research, and that they will 
find inspiration in Anscombe for future work. We would like to thank the 
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following people for their help in making this volume possible: the authors 
for their high-quality articles, the reviewers whose reports we independently 
solicited and finally the editorial staff of Enrahonar (especially David Casacu-
berta) for their/his support during the work on this issue.
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